Reducing the incidence of crime is a primary task of the criminal justice
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. criminal justice system operates on an estimated annual budget of more than 180 billion dollars.1 At any given time, the system employs more than 870,000 police officers,2 32,800 prosecutors,3 an untallyable [Vol. 109 fundamental question is whether the system is worth its significant costs in both resources and human lives.
While demands for accountability are both prudent and fair, determining how to measure effectiveness is difficult. Whether the focus of evaluation is on the success of system actors (such as police, prosecutors, or judges), participants (such as arrestees, defendants, or prisoners), or specific interventions (such as drug courts, probation supervision, or restorative justice programs); it is not always clear how success should be defined or measured. If the goal of the criminal justice system is to advance public safety and promote proportional accountability for wrongdoing,9 then the best metrics would be those that reveal how well system actors prevent criminal harm or restore community confidence that justice has been served. Such outcomes are difficult to quantify, however, and policy analysts often default to measurements that are easier to gather: number of arrests made, amount of restitution collected, or number of convictions secured. 10 Those within the criminal justice system and those outside it rely heavily on another measure of success: rates of recidivism. Recidivism rates are one of the primary ways that legislators, policymakers, grant funders, media outlets, and criminal justice system actors determine whether specific criminal justice interventions have succeeded or failed.11 As Joan Petersilia wrote in her authoritative article on recidivism:
Do to Improve Police Accountability?, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic. com/politics/archive/2016/03/police-accountability/472524/ [https://perma.cc/96M8-R24G] (last visited May 5, 2019) ("The lack of reliable information on policing has been a major hindrance to discussions."). 9 There are, of course, many purposes to the criminal justice system. 11 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-81w(b) (2007) ("The success of the reentry strategy shall be measured by: (1) The rates of recidivism and community revictimization . . . ."); TEX. GOV'T CODE § 509.003(a)(3) (2015) ("The [Community Justice Assistance Division] shall propose and the board shall adopt reasonable rules establishing . . . methods for measuring the success of community supervision and corrections programs, including methods for measuring rates of diversion, program completion, and Defining and measuring recidivism are . . . central to answering the question "How well are we doing?" It has been said that recidivism rates are to the criminologist what the Geiger counter is to the geologist. In other words, they are the most objective overall basis we have for evaluating the performance of justice agencies.12
While criminologists have developed nuanced ways of gathering and interpreting recidivism data, criminal justice agencies typically examine recidivism rates in isolation from other available measures of success.13 On its face, recidivism seems a sensible metric: re-offense is what recidivism rates purport to measure, and a reduction in crime is undeniably a primary goal of the criminal justice system. Moreover, when a convicted person does . . grant recipients is to implement evidence-based practices and core correctional practices . . . . States that receive SRR grants utilize the funds to pursue an intensive, collaborative process that brings the governor's office, state policymakers, and corrections leaders together to set measurable recidivism-reduction goals and develop practical, data-driven plans to achieve them."). 12 not offend again, that is a success. Even so, there is a difference between commending those who abandon crime entirely-whether by virtue of a criminal justice intervention or otherwise-and saying that the criminal justice system fails whenever it does not fully transform law-breakers into models of perfect compliance.
One problem with recidivism is that it is a binary measure: either a person commits a new crime, or he does not. Absent from data that measure rates of recidivism is an appreciation for the nuances of human behavioral change. The addict who stops selling drugs (but shoplifts a few canned goods) and the batterer who again assaults his wife are both "recidivists," but there is a clear distinction between them. Recidivism as a metric is not sensitive to reductions in the severity or frequency of offending, even though such reductions often serve as markers of progress and indicate a reduction in harm caused to the community.14 By over-relying on recidivism rates to gauge success, policymakers and system actors alike risk underappreciating change by individual defendants and undervaluing the criminal justice interventions that move people forward. Moreover, by looking only at whether past offenders have recidivated, rather than at how often and in what ways they recidivate, system actors risk missing clues about escalating dangers or underestimating the harm inflicted by ill-conceived interventions.
So, how should success and failure be measured when it comes to the criminal justice system and those in it? Much of that depends on what we are trying to measure and what resources we have available to capture data. While there are many ways to gauge individual and programmatic success,15 this Article focuses on one particularly simple alternative to recidivism: markers of desistance.
Criminologists have long studied what makes people stop committing crimes. Studies have examined youth and adults at various life stages and have identified a myriad psychological, social, physical, and environmental factors that are correlated with desistance16-that is, the process by which people disentangle themselves from criminal behavior and connect to 14 See infra Section III.A. 15 These include examining individuals' pre and post-intervention health, substance abuse rates, economic prosperity, community engagement, and self-reported satisfaction with programs and program staff. prosocial activities and associates.17 While the path to desistance is not always a straight one,18 the data by which sociologists track behavior often focuses on the severity and frequency of an individual's criminal behavior.19 Serious "persisters" can be identified by their often frequent involvement in crime and sometimes by an escalation in their offense severity.20 "Desisters," by contrast, can be identified by their sometimes instant, but more often gradual, termination of criminal behavior.21 This more nuanced, academic approach to gathering and analyzing crime data has, for the most part, not translated into changes in the way criminal justice administrators measure and report rates of recidivism.22
When desistance is discussed in the legal criminal justice literature, it is often used as an antonym for recidivism, rather than as a description of the process by which one progresses toward the end-goal of complete compliance with the law.23 17 Cf. id. at 11 ("Termination is the time at which criminal activity stops. Desistance, by contrast, is the causal process that supports the termination of offending. Some of the metrics gathered by criminologists-particularly intervals between offenses and offense severity over time-are easily ascertainable by reference to the recidivism data already collected and analyzed by the criminal justice system. While such data remain an imperfect measure of change, utilizing these "markers of desistance" would enable policymakers and criminal justice stakeholders to develop a significantly more nuanced picture of offenders' aggregate and individual behavioral change and of how criminal justice interventions positively and negatively affect that change. Rather than limiting the definition of "success" to those state interventions that (rather implausibly) claim to fully eradicate criminal behavior among some fraction of their participants, success should also be understood to include those programs that move people forward on the path of desistance. Similarly, by seeing desistance as a process, system actors might better discern both positive and negative behavioral changes in repeat offenders, allowing them to contextualize the statistical predictions of individual recidivism risk currently used by criminal justice agencies at all stages of the criminal process.
This Article speaks broadly to criminal justice scholars, administrators, and stakeholders but especially to those who lack specialized training in the statistical methods used by criminologists to study recidivism and desistance. It explains to a legal audience the limitations of relying on recidivism rates as a measure of systemic or individual "success" and encourages the adoption of desistance over time as an alternative measure. It does so for three reasons. First, it is relatively easy to do: markers of desistance can be easily derived from existing recidivism data. Second, focusing on markers of desistance increases the system's ability to accurately discern which criminal justice programs are improving offender behavior and which are causing greater harm. Finally, training system stakeholders to see success in markers of desistance, and not just in the absence of recidivism, can shape the way judges, lawyers, and correctional administrators employ the recidivism risk prediction tools that are increasingly being adopted by criminal justice agencies.
Part I describes the many ways recidivism is currently used to measure and predict the success or failure of programs and people within the criminal justice system. Part II dissects the concept of recidivism, examining the many ways in which it has been defined and measured and translating for legal audiences the meanings of recidivism rates as they are reported by program analysts. Part III explores how criminology and analogous fields understand the phenomenon of behavioral change and measure the success of programmatic interventions. In light of the mechanisms of behavioral change discussed in Part III, Part IV examines the problems created directly and indirectly by overreliance on recidivism data, including incentives for data gaming, the premature termination of otherwise promising programs for advancing public safety, and excessively risk-averse behavior by system actors. Part V concludes with a call for change in how policymakers and criminal justice system actors think about and measure success in the criminal justice system. It encourages administrators and policymakers to draw on markers of desistance to provide a significantly more nuanced picture of individual change over time, and of the role that criminal justice interventions may play in promoting or hindering that change process.
I. DEFINING SUCCESS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
It is easy to imagine any number of ways in which the effectiveness of the criminal justice system might be assessed. Efforts could be undertaken to quantify reductions in crime24 or improvements in the degree to which people feel safe when going about their daily business.25 Policymakers could assess metrics of community health26 or the satisfaction of stakeholders, from crime victims to defendants. 27 We measure what we value, and for that reason any metric we select is likely to tell us as much about those who operate the criminal justice system as it is to tell us about the effectiveness of the system itself. While more robust metrics (like those listed above) are collected and analyzed in isolated instances, policymakers and criminal justice stakeholders tend to give minimal attention to measures beyond recidivism.28 24 Paul Ekbloma & Ken Pease, Evaluating Crime Prevention, 9 CRIME & JUST. 585, 643 (1995) (detailing the challenges of quantifying the effects of crime prevention efforts, including problems with " [b] ackground fluctuation in the variables of interest, uncertainties in the interpretation of cause and effect, and vagaries in how programs are implemented are among the recurring problems"). 25 Recidivism reduction has attracted investors in more ways than one. Entirely apart from social impact bonds, private companies have begun to fill the growing demand for tools that can predict the risk that criminal defendants, probationers, prisoners, and parolees will commit future crimes.49 Peddling proprietary algorithms that purport to predict risk and identify individual treatment needs, private companies like Equivant (formerly Northpointe) are finding a profitable market as criminal justice stakeholders seek data to guide sentencing, supervision, and release decisions.50 Studies of these risk-and-needs tools vary in appraisals of their accuracy. Some studies claim that the tools outperform human judgment in their predictions of future offending,51 and others claim that the tools increase pre-existing racial and class disparities in punishment without accurately sorting minor offenders from serious ones.52 However good or bad these tools may prove to be, their popularity unquestionably entrenches the fear of avoiding recidivism in any form.53
("Because often millions of dollars will hinge upon whether or not social outcome goals have been met, it is imperative that all parties understand social outcome measurement."). 49 The pressure to emphasize recidivism data has come from internal stakeholders, too. The Conference of Chief Justices has promoted greater use of risk assessment tools asserting that "the best research evidence has shown that use of validated offender risk and need assessment tools is critical in reducing recidivism."54 Taking an equally optimistic view, individual judges have also spoken in favor of greater attention to recidivism risks and rates. Judge Roger Warren, for example, has advocated nationally for greater consideration of recidivism risks at sentencing and for using evidence of recidivism to evaluate the effectiveness of criminal justice programs.55 His position turns in large part on an assessment that, unlike in decades past, social scientists now know enough about drivers of recidivism to reduce risk of future offense:
Today . . . we know-based on meticulous meta-analyses of rigorously conducted scientific research-that unlike incarceration the right kinds of rehabilitation and treatment programs carefully targeted at specific crime-related risk factors among medium-to high-risk offenders can reduce offender recidivism by conservative estimates of 10 to 20 percent.56
Judge Michael Marcus has similarly advocated for the broader use of recidivism risk assessment tools and greater attention to recidivism rates, optimistically asserting that properly-designed correctional programs "can hope to produce roughly a 30% reduction in recidivism among many common offenders."57 He argues that because "the public is concerned, most of all, with how successfully [the criminal justice system] prevent[s] recidivism," attention to recidivism risks and rates is an essential component of modern sentencing.58
At times, academics have also embraced recidivism as a metric for success in the criminal justice system, albeit with some caveats. Francis Cullen, Cheryl Jonson, and Daniel Mears recently suggested "recidivism reduction should be defined as the core goal of corrections, including community-based agencies. Wardens, prison staff, probation and parole 54 Given the wide variety of ways in which recidivism measures and predictions are used to assess the success of criminal justice programs and the people upon whom they intervene, it is important to understand exactly what recidivism means. Despite the criminal justice system's heavy reliance on recidivism rates, there is surprising variation in how recidivism is defined and measured.62 Nevertheless, data purporting to track or predict recidivism is put to a myriad of uses, from deciding which treatment programs to fund to deciding what sentences to impose on individual defendants.63 The following subsections discuss in greater detail how recidivism is defined and measured in today's criminal justice system.
A. DEFINING RECIDIVISM
Recidivism data attempt to quantify whether a person who has committed a crime in the past has gone on to commit another crime in the future.64 While the concept is simple, it is notoriously difficult to measure.65 59 Id. 60 Francis T. Cullen et al., Reinventing Community Corrections, 46 CRIME & JUST. 27, 50 (2017). 61 Id. at 49. Although Cullen, Jonson, and Mears embrace the idea of gathering and analyzing recidivism data, they also acknowledge that there are risks associated with emphasizing recidivism reduction, including the very real risk of data gaming. Id. at 51 ("When accountability is heightened, strong incentives emerge to game the systems."). For a full discussion on this point, see infra Section IV.A. 62 here often are simply too many variables to account for, too many actors with too much and too many kinds of discretion, for us to confidently credit a deliberate program for a measured outcome."). [Vol. 109
The first challenge in quantifying recidivism is deciding what constitutes proof of a subsequent crime. Most people do not boldly proclaim their criminal exploits, and instead seek to hide-or at least downplay-their involvement in illegal activities. This basic fact makes formal detection (and therefore measurement) of criminal behavior difficult.
The most effective way to measure behavior is through longitudinal studies.66 In such settings, researchers follow subjects over long periods of time-often decades-periodically surveying, interviewing, and gathering third party data about subjects' behavior.67 Researchers conducting such studies provide participants with guarantees of confidentiality and other protections designed to reduce the risk that honest confessions about illegal behavior will result in consequences of any kind.68 Longitudinal studies are expensive and time consuming, however. For these reasons, they are typically conducted by academic researchers, and not by criminal justice program analysts.
Analysts who work within the criminal justice system are limited in ways academics are not. They are frequently under pressure to produce assessment results in short periods of time and to satisfy funders, policymakers, and the public of the effectiveness of the programs they are assessing.69 Moreover, as state agents, they are not always positioned to offer 66 the same confidentiality protections researchers use to glean more accurate information about illegal behavior.70 Not that anyone within the criminal justice system regularly asks convicted people to provide such incriminating information: the limited resources of most agencies and actors within the system assure that the only recidivism data typically collected by state agencies draws from formal court or law enforcement records, rather than individual self-reports.71 The result is that while the criminal justice system purports to measure recidivism, what recidivism data usually measure are rates of re-capture-outcomes that turn as much on luck and policing patterns as they do on deviant behavior. (2015) . The tension between the role of correctional agencies as executive branch law enforcers and their role as publicly-accountable agencies can create ethical tensions in how they conduct research-and, consequently, in how forthcoming their subjects are likely to be. 71 See Farrington, supra note 66 at 463 (reporting on results of a longitudinal study of youthful offenders that "found that the prevalence, frequency, and duration of criminal careers were all greater for reported offending than for arrests and that the escalation from minor to more serious crimes was greater for reported offending than for arrests"); James L. Johnson iolence] courts could be measured, these rates can be deceiving because of chronic underreporting by victims."). Because re-capture data are based solely on behavior detected by the criminal justice system, such data will necessarily be over-inclusive of the "failures" of heavily-policed communities and underinclusive of the failures of those whose behavior is not as closely surveilled. Given policing patterns in the United States, that suggests that recidivism rates may fail to reflect the behavior of under-policed members of society, who will be predominantly affluent and white. events can be used as proxies for recidivism: arrest, charge, conviction, and revocation from community supervision.73 Some studies use only one of these measures, while others examine a combination of two or more.74 Importantly, there is no national standard governing the choice of triggering events, and typically no standardization within a single state or county.75 Comparing recidivism rates across programs or jurisdictions is therefore an often futile task, since each study provides a different measure of reoffense.76 This lack of uniformity is particularly problematic given the different flaws inherent in each possible triggering event.
In some ways, arrest and charge data may get closer to capturing true recidivism data than conviction records can because they track events in which, at a minimum, the suspect behaved in a way that gave police or prosecutors probable cause to believe he had re-offended.77 These records are less likely than conviction records to be underinclusive of criminal behavior, although they are less comprehensive than self-reported data gathered by third-party researchers because they rely on official detection of deviant behavior, which invariably will miss many instances of illegal conduct.
Arrest and charge data are not necessarily better than conviction data, since they risk being overinclusive. Police may arrest the wrong suspect or may arrest for behavior that turns out not to be criminal at all once a full 73 Petersilia, supra note 12, at 383. 74 See generally Johnson, supra note 71, at 52 (2017) (comparing recidivism studies that use different measures); see also Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 76-77 (2017) (reporting on the markers of recidivism used by a variety of recidivism risk prediction tools). 75 See, e.g. Letter from Kamala Harris, Cal. Atty. Gen., to Public Safety Partners 1-2 (Oct. 16, 2014), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/Recidivism%20Definiti on%20Letter%2C%20AG%20Harris.pdf [https://perma.cc/55U9-Z6CG] (observing that "California lacks any uniform or standard way to measure the rate of individuals who recommit crimes" and proposing a statewide definition of recidivism as "[a]n arrest resulting in a charge within three years of an individual's release from incarceration or placement on supervision for a previous criminal conviction"); see also Phil W. Harris et al., Defining and Measuring Recidivism 1 COUNCIL JUV. CORRECTIONAL ADMINS. (2009) (observing that "using the average of state juvenile recidivism rates for a small number of states, the national juvenile rate could be anywhere between 25% and 55% depending on what measure of recidivism is used to comprise the measure"). 76 Petersilia, supra note 12, at 382 (observing that "recidivism data in one study are seldom comparable to the data in another"). 77 investigation has been completed.78 Charges may be brought against the wrong defendant or may not align with the actual behavior in which the defendant engaged.79 The fact that many of these cases do not proceed to conviction gives rise to doubt about whether a crime occurred at all or whether an error was made by system actors themselves.80
Conviction data have the advantage of being the least overinclusive because they require that a defendant either admit to the charged conduct or be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Nonetheless, conviction data have the distinct disadvantage of being underinclusive in many cases. Criminal cases may be disposed of pre-conviction for many reasons that have nothing to do with innocence. Police error, prosecutorial resource constraints, policy choices, and difficulty developing evidence all can lead to dismissal of charges (or later acquittal at trial), even in cases when a defendant has actually committed a crime.81 As a result, while conviction data generate the fewest false positives among potential events suggestive of recidivism, they include an unknown and potentially significant rate of false negatives.82
In addition to conviction, arrest, or charging data, many studies of recidivism also count revocation from probation or any form of post-release supervision as a triggering event.83 While incarceration is an important event to capture in recidivism data, individuals who are revoked from community supervision have not always committed a new crime.84 New criminal behavior can certainly trigger revocation (and often will) but so can so-called 78 
To determine whether a person subject to a criminal justice intervention goes on to re-offend, perfect data would capture that person's behavior for the remainder of his life-or at least until enough time has passed that he no longer remains at an elevated risk of committing future offenses. Although individuals with prior records-like those without them-can commit 85 88 Recidivism data vary not only in definitions of recidivism and length of follow-up windows, but also in the start and end times of follow-up window. In order to assess whether people's behavior has been altered by criminal justice interventions, it is necessary to study them when they are "at hazard" of detection and punishment. See Kurlycheck et al., supra note 69, at 72-79 (discussing methods of conducting long-term studies). While people commit crime in jails and prisons, as well as in the community, fewer opportunities exist in such closely-monitored environments. Consequently, follow-up studies for prisoners commence typically upon release from custody and not immediately following sentencing. criminal offenses spontaneously at any point in life, research suggests that as time without re-offense lengthens, the odds of recidivism diminish significantly. Al Blumstein and Kiminori Nakamura's work on redemption has examined how long a person convicted of a crime must go without reoffending before he or she obtains a predicted risk of future arrest no higher than that of a similarly-aged person in the general population.89 While the exact window varies based on the age of the convicted person and the type of crimes the person has committed, their research suggests that the average "redemption time" was between ten and thirteen years after conviction.90
Blumstein and Nakamura's findings suggest that a ten to fifteen year follow-up period would provide a thorough picture of the effect of criminal justice programs on long-term recidivism; however, a follow-up window of that length is beyond the capacity of most criminal justice agencies.91 The good news is that Blumstein and Nakamura's work confirms what other studies have repeatedly found: the vast majority of those who recidivate do so within the first few years following release from custody.92 As time without re-offense lengthens, fewer people go on to recidivate at later points in time.93 For this reason, shorter follow-up windows will yield useful, albeit incomplete, information that can meaningfully capture the majority of those who recidivate following any given intervention. That fact, coupled with the observation that the effects of any criminal justice intervention, are likely to fade over time, means that data about former offenders' behavior in the years that immediately follow sanction are not only the easiest data to obtain but are also likely to be the most relevant for determining whether system interventions are having a widespread effect on recidivism rates. , supra note 88, at 4. Importantly, the BJS study concludes that recidivism rates, while reduced over time, persisted at higher levels than a three-year snapshot would suggest. Id.
92 Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 89, at 331 ("Studies on recidivism consistently demonstrate that those who have offended in the past will have the highest probability of reoffending within several years, and the probability will decline steadily afterward."); MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET Typically, recidivism studies compare the performance of a defined cohort to that of a baseline population over an equal period of time.94 For example, a study of participants in a prison education program might report how program graduates fared during the three years following their release from custody, as compared to a similar cohort of released prisoners who did not participate in the educational program.95 Once variables other than the intervention are controlled for, the difference between the performance of the two groups is then attributed to the intervention itself.96
The results of recidivism studies are often used to determine whether specific criminal justice interventions "reduce recidivism." What that means is not necessarily self-evident. When a program is found to reduce recidivism by, 10%, that does not mean that each individual who completes the program will, on average, go on to commit 10% less crime than the person otherwise would have committed. Instead, it means that an aggregate group of people who complete the program will have 10% fewer members of their cohort recidivate than a comparable group of people who did not complete the program. This is an important distinction for several reasons.
First, it reminds us that no retrospective study, or even any predictive tool, can tell us what any individual person will do in the future. It is impossible to know from a person's characteristics and past behavior whether the person's most recent conviction will be the last or whether the person will go on to commit serious violations.97 The very best risk prediction instruments currently available can tell us which factors, on average, drive recidivism, and what people with histories and characteristics similar to a particular offender are statistically likely to do in the future.98 However, given the variation of human behavior,99 no instrument can reliably predict 94 . . an ex-offender may need to experience some level of personal success in the straight world before they realise that they do not need to offend to regain a sense of personal agency") (internal citations omitted); Laub & Sampson, supra, note 16, at 55 ("[G]iven the role of human agency in the desistance process, we need to find a way to measure individual motivation, free will, and ultimately the decision to initiate and embrace the process of change."). 100 See Starr, supra note 98, at 806 (explaining that instruments designed to predict recidivism employ "underlying regression models [that] may provide reasonably precise estimates of the average recidivism rates for the group of offenders sharing the defendant's characteristics, but the uncertainty about what an individual offender will do is much greater, and when it comes to predicting individual behavior, the models offer fairly modest improvements over chance"). at bail hearings,101 sentencing hearings,102 and in correctional decisionmaking.103 Despite the de-personalized nature of risk predictions, reports of predicted future risk can affect defendants' access to bond, the nature and length of a sentence, and the level of supervision and number of conditions to which those serving community-based sentences will be subjected. 104 Second, the aggregate nature of the data contained in recidivism studies means that it is impossible to predict from recidivism rates alone which specific people will benefit from any particular intervention. For example, if a program claims to reduce recidivism by 25%, policymakers cannot assume that all program graduates will leave the program 25% less likely to reoffend. Rather, if the baseline re-offense rate for those who do not participate in the program is 50%, then policymakers can predict that 37.5% of those who do complete the program will go on to recidivate while the remainder will not.105 From recidivism data alone, however, they cannot predict who the recidivists will be or what characteristics they may share in common.
Finally, properly interpreting recidivism study outcomes is important because it helps explain why those within the criminal justice system often consider interventions successful even when they achieve very small reductions in recidivism. To a layperson, it seems strange to say that a program can be "successful" if it reduces a cohort's (often high) risk of future offending by a mere 10% or 15%. However, for many criminal justice programs, a reduction of even 10% in baseline offending is considered a respectable result.106 The modest recidivism reduction demonstrated by many popular correctional interventions is one of the reasons why a sizeable number of policymakers and correctional administrators view penal rehabilitation with skepticism.107 With treatment outcomes that reduce recidivism by such modest percentages, it is not hard to see why the claim that "nothing works" to reform repeat offenders has been a recurring mantra since Robert Martinson's now-infamous article was first published. 112 Programs can succeed in assisting people even when they fail to reduce or eliminate criminal behavior. Helping participants conquer addictions, obtain an education, treat unmet mental health needs, and improve job and parenting skills are all programmatic results that may be achieved with or without a commensurate reduction in recidivism. It is important to notice that neither recidivism rates nor the "markers of desistance" I advocate measuring in one measure of success: whether people who complete a program go on to commit any offense within the follow-up window. Recidivism data, as typically reported, omit a host of important contextual information, including whether the individuals being followed were first-time or chronic offenders;113 whether the new offenses were minor or serious; or whether program participants changed their rates of offending after having completed the program. In short, pure recidivism data do not provide us with any sense of whether a program or other intervention reduces harm but rather how often it produces perfection. Not surprisingly, for many offenders, perfect outcomes are difficult to achieve.
III. BEHAVIORAL CHANGE AND DESISTANCE FROM CRIME
The preceding sections have discussed the challenge of measuring recidivism in a way that provides policymakers with a clear and accurate picture of how criminal justice interventions affect subsequent behavior. These challenges include detecting recidivism over time and discerning which portions of recidivism data are related to the behavior of former offenders and which are better attributed to the behavior of system actors. Theoretically, with adequate resources and effort, many of these methodological challenges could be overcome-or at least mitigated. But even if policymakers are able to bring greater standardization to the measurement of recidivism, larger problems remain.
A. UNDERSTANDING CHANGE Although policymakers rarely articulate the assumptions that support using recidivism as the primary measure of success, doing so has value, if only to focus attention on how implausible many of those assumptions are. Recidivism, as it is currently framed, is a binary metric: either a person engages in behavior indicative of new criminal activity within the window of time the person's post-intervention behavior is being measured or the person does not. If the person does, he or she is labeled a recidivist and is considered a failure. If the person does not commit a new crime, then he or she is successful. On a larger scale, the same evaluation applies to criminal justice programs: if the programs reduce aggregate recidivism, they succeed. If they do not, they have failed. To probe the plausibility of this approach for measuring success, it is helpful to review what is known about the dynamics of human behavioral change, of which the cessation of crime is but one variation. The commission of crime is, after all, a subset of the much larger category of antisocial behavior, which is combatted in various contexts not only by police and correctional personnel but also by parents, teachers, doctors, industrial engineers, and employers.114 The study and practice of motivating prosocial behavioral change is a common human enterprise, and consequently, a wide variety of fields offer examples of alternative ways in which change can be documented and quantified.
Through education and conditioning, humans are socialized from infancy to behave in ways that are culturally acceptable within their milieu.115 The process of acculturation is ongoing, and as environments and expectations change throughout the life course, behaviors that were adaptive in one environment or acceptable in one life stage must be discarded and new 114 See, e.g., MEME HIENEMAN ET AL., PARENTING WITH POSITIVE BEHAVIOR SUPPORT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO habits acquired.116 Each discipline, from public health to education to criminology, has its own paradigm for explaining how behavioral change occurs, but all share one feature in common: they see behavior change as a process and not as an event.
In public health, the popular "transtheoretical model" identifies six specific stages of change relevant to the abandonment of any maladaptive behavior.117 These stages, which follow one another in roughly sequential (though sometimes overlapping) order are pre-contemplation, contemplation, preparation, action, maintenance, and termination.118 In the pre-contemplation stage people deny or ignore the behaviors in need of change, with no intention of altering their current behavior.119 In the contemplation stage, they wrestle with ambivalence about whether they think change is possible or desirable.120 In the preparation stage, they begin to muster the skills and the will to break old habits and build new ones, thus developing a plan for how they will make needed changes.121 In the action stage, they begin to change behavior.122 Importantly, the change that occurs in this stage is not always complete. In the context of smoking cessation, action may involve reducing the number of daily cigarettes smoked: for weight loss, it may involve calorie reduction.123 The change must be a significant alteration from the pre-action behavior, but it need not be perfected. As the new behaviors become more consistent and habitual, and the old fade away, people move into the maintenance stage, which may last from six months to five years.124 Termination is the final stage, one that may be more ideal than real for most people:
Termination is the stage in which individuals have zero temptation and 100% selfefficacy. No matter whether they are depressed, anxious, bored, lonely, angry, or stressed, they are sure they will not return to their old unhealthy habit as a way of coping.125 116 125 Id. In its requirement of perfect abstinence from maladaptive behavior, termination sounds a lot like recidivism: black and white with no margins of error.
As people move through each stage, back-sliding-or relapse-is not uncommon. In fact, "relapse tends to be the rule when action is taken for most health behavior problems," though it often precipitates a fresh effort at positive change. 126 The key insight from the transtheoretical model is that "[b]ehavior change is a process that unfolds over time through a sequence of stages." 127 The transtheoretical model has been tested across a wide range of behaviors, ranging from addiction to overeating to smoking to delinquency to substance abuse.128 Regardless of the behaviors studied, the model appears fairly descriptive of the internal and behavioral processes that underlie change. 129 In education, behavior change, in the form of social learning, is typically explained as the acquisition and mastery of skills over time. 130 In order to move from maladaptive behaviors to more mature, prosocial behaviors, students must be taught the correct way to be behave. That is, they must see the desired behavior modeled, must be given opportunities to practice the skill with corrective and formative feedback, and must have opportunities for continued practice in multiple settings, both formal and informal. 131 The Positive Behavioral Support model, which has gained traction in many American public schools as a model for advancing behavioral change,132 posits that:
[A]lthough learning and teaching processes are complex and continuous, and some behavior initially is not learned (e.g., biobehavioral), key messages from this science are that much of human behavior is learned, comes under the control of environmental factors, and can be changed. The strength of the science is that problem behaviors become more understandable, and, as our understanding grows, so does our ability to teach more socially appropriate and functional behavior.133
In this model, the mechanisms for preventing antisocial behavior and the mechanisms for responding to it are the same: prevention and early intervention efforts; a "culture that provides multiple opportunities to display and receive positive reinforcement for prosocial behavior;" a range of strategies and responses that can be calibrated to the specific problem behavior and to the needs of the learner; and a reliance on evidence-based programs.134
While much of the literature on behavioral education is focused on teaching children and young adult learners, the principles on which they rest transfer readily to adult learners. Prosocial education is by no means limited to the formation of children; adult learners can also manifest disruptive behaviors that require intervention by educators, ranging from inattention to threats of violence.135 Notably, the correctional programs that appear to be most effective in reducing recidivism are those that utilize a cognitive-based therapy (CBT) approach.136 The "goal of CBT is to help offenders develop a new way of thinking by providing them with a chance to model, role-play, and practice pro-social skills."137 That model, which employs the same tools advocated by educators, has repeatedly outperformed other models of correctional intervention in terms of its effect on recidivism rates.138 That fact bolsters the key insight educators offer: the mastery of skills occurs over time and comes only with repeated practice. 139 The subfields of sociology known as developmental and life course criminology embrace paradigms of behavioral change that complement those used by educators and public health providers in many ways. Through longitudinal studies of the kind discussed above, criminologists have examined the ways in which antisocial behavior, both criminal and noncriminal, manifests at different life stages. 140 In doing so, they have focused on identifying the factors that correlate not only with commencement of crime but with its termination. The term used most often to describe this disentanglement from criminal behavior is desistance. 141 While desistance is sometimes used as a synonym for termination of offending, it is not a singular event.142 Rather, as Sampson and Laub explain in their seminal work on the subject, desistance "is a social transition that entails identity transformation, as from a smoker to a nonsmoker, from a married or coupled person to a divorced or uncoupled person, or from an offender to a nonoffender."143 In other words, "just like quitting smoking or uncoupling, desistance is best viewed as a process rather than a discrete event." 144 Across an individual's lifespan, engagement with crime varies according to a wide number of variables, the most powerful being age. 145 In youth, crime is so statistically prevalent that it is considered sociologically [Vol. 109 normative,146 particularly among males-a fact that explains why most crimes are committed by men between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five. 147 With age usually (and gradually) comes wisdom, lower energy, more peer restraints, and, typically, desistance from crime.148 Although the pathways into and out of criminal behavior vary from person to person, there are some factors that repeatedly have been found to affect desistance:
[D]esistance stems from a variety of complex processes-developmental, psychological, and sociological-and thus there are several factors associated with it. The key elements seem to be aging; a good marriage; securing legal, stable work; and deciding to "go straight," including a reorientation of the costs and benefits of crime. Processes of desistance from crime in general, specific types of crime, and multiple forms of problem behavior seem to be quite similar. 149 What is it about these elements that promotes desistance? Most scholars conclude that it is not the events per se, but rather the moral and emotional "turning points" they provide that create opportunities for people to redefine their identities and accordingly reshape their behavior. 150 No single turning point can be guaranteed to change behavior, but each offers an opportunity for re-orientation. In this model, criminal sanctions, educational attainments, drug treatment, or a new relationship all serve a similar function with respect to behavioral change: they provide a new chapter in a person's life narrative that may reinforce a negative self-identity or offer a chance to change one's story.151 Although there are documented cases in which a singular, salient event precipitated the decision to "go straight," a more common story is that multiple opportunities for change combine, leading to a gradual diminishment in criminal behavior. Whether this is understood as a change in identity,152 a change in social role,153 or a re-interpretation of a life narrative,154 the result is the same: through a process of reflection and socialization, a person disentangles herself from crime.
B. MEASURING PROGRESS
If change is a process rather than an event, using a binary metric like recidivism is too one-dimensional. While recidivism data tell us whether those exposed to various interventions re-offended during the follow-up window, they tell us nothing about the nature of the re-offense or whether the trajectory of a person's subsequent contacts with the law suggest a move toward desistance or away from it. But what alternatives exist? Not surprisingly, answers can be found by again considering how fields related to criminal justice respond to the challenge of measuring change over time.
Education is a good place to start. Like criminal justice, American primary education is a local enterprise with significant variation among states in the contents and methods of teaching.155 Also like criminal justice, education involves the outlay of significant public funds: in 2013-2014, states and the federal government spent $634 billion on K-12 education.156 With that investment comes a demand for public accountability.
In recent years, there have been numerous attempts at the federal and state levels to standardize curricula and require the generation and analysis of metrics, such as standardized test scores, to hold teachers accountable for 151 See generally SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND REBUILD THEIR LIVES (2001) (discussing differences in the autobiographical narratives of "persisters" and "desisters"); Uggen & Massoglia, supra note 146, at 311. student learning.157 Standardized tests, which students across the country are required to take at periodic intervals,158 are the educational analogs to recidivism rates. They measure educational achievement in tested subject matter and nothing more. When high percentages of students make adequate yearly progress on grade level expectations, state and local education systems are often lauded as successes, and when large numbers fail to make such progress, schools and teachers are labeled as "failing."159 A difference between education and criminal justice is that while criminal justice administrators have largely accepted recidivism as a valid metric of their own success, educators and educational administrators have heavily resisted such simplistic measures of achievement. 160 Recognizing the wide variety of factors that affect student learning-many of which lie outside educators' control-teachers across the country have fought efforts to define educational success by reference only to test scores.161 Through unions lobbying, media campaigns, and grassroots coalition building, educators have fought against what they assert has been an over-emphasis on tests scores alone as a metric of student and teacher achievement. 162 In response, some districts have introduced "value-added" assessments to better capture the role of teachers in student growth over time. The goal of these tools is to control for "exogenous factors" such as poverty, friends, and familial stability, "focus[ing] on achievement gains over time for the same individual or groups of students."163 Although such assessments theoretically offer a more nuanced way of measuring student growth-and the role of teachers in fostering it-they too have been met with pushback from educators.164 Their objections are grounded in part on the difficulty of "isolat[ing] one specific teacher's contribution to students' learning, leading to situations where a teacher might be identified as a bad teacher simply because her colleagues are ineffective."165
Educators have argued instead that because "learning is a complex process," assessments of learning should . . . emplo[y] a diverse array of methods, including those that call for actual performance, using them over time so as to reveal change, growth, and increasing degrees of integration. Such an approach aims for a more complete and accurate picture of learning, and therefore firmer bases for improving . . . students' educational experience. 166 In other words, without rejecting the role that data can play in assessing the success of the educational enterprise, teachers and school administrators have required that data be used to trace the learning process itself, looking for multiple forms of evidence of growth over time rather than simple snapshots of isolated performance.
Of course, there are key differences between education and corrections. Failure to learn can reduce the quality of students' lives, but it does not imperil the lives of others. Crime sometimes does endanger others, and it nearly always reduces the quality of life for those affected by it. In light of that difference, it might seem fair to hold the criminal justice system to a higher standard. The problem is that overreliance on recidivism provides only one-dimensional data that masks important information about the degree to which criminal justice interventions are, in the words of educational assessment, "adding value"-or reducing it. Examining more nuanced data about individual and aggregate behavioral change over time could yield much more revealing information about not just whether, but in what ways [Vol. 109 people recidivate and the degree to which criminal justice programs move them away from criminal behavior or propel them toward it.
So, what relevance does the experience of educators have for attempts to measure success in the criminal justice system? First, like educators, criminal justice system actors should demand an acknowledgement by policymakers and the public that recidivism is affected by a host of interacting, exogenous factors, many of which the criminal justice system can do little to affect. Second, like educators, criminal justice system actors should resist efforts to oversimplify the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of interventions by reference to a measure as insensitive as pure recidivism rates.
But what is the alternative to relying on recidivism? The answer to that question can be found in the way criminologists measure change over time. Although criminologists gather data on recidivism, they do not examine it in isolation. Rather, in identifying "what works" to promote desistance, criminologists look not at isolated recidivism rates but rather at how those rates of offense change over time for individual offenders and among readilyidentifiable subgroups of offenders ("youth" or "burglars" for example) as well as how those changes connect to other key contextual events.167 The richest studies meld qualitative and quantitative data to create a threedimensional view of the effects of various life events and interventions.
Those in the criminal justice system do not typically have the resources to extend follow-up windows or conduct surveys or interviews. That does not mean, however, that they must settle for pure recidivism rates. In recent years, policy-engaged criminologists have suggested that criminal justice administrators should look beyond recidivism rates to identify the patterns of behavior those rates can reveal over time. In a notable policy brief, Ryan King and Brian Elderbroom of the Urban Institute urged state program administrators to think more broadly about measuring programmatic success.168 They explained, "Though failure rates should serve as the foundation of recidivism research, it is critical to move beyond them to improving recidivism as a performance measure."169 Specifically, they urged states to include in reports measures such as "time to failure, crime severity, and behavior changes as indicators of success."170 More recently, in a white paper arising out of the Harvard Kennedy School Executive Session on 167 See, e.g., MARUNA, supra note 151. 168 Replete throughout the desistance literature are references to indicators that signal desistance or its absence.173 Some of these, such as attitudes about the law, are best captured through qualitative research. Several, howeverparticularly changes in offense severity over time and alterations in the frequency of offending-are easily derived from existing recidivism data by calculating changes in crime severity over time, and the time between new criminal incidents. Rarely, however, do these markers of desistance make their way into reports assessing the effectiveness of any particular criminal justice program.
To illustrate this point, imagine that you are a program analyst who has decided to conduct a five-year recidivism study examining re-arrest rates of all graduates of a prison-based anger management course. To assess recidivism rates, you will need to collect arrest records for program graduates and for members of a control group of prisoners who did not take the class but are otherwise similar to those who did. With just those records, you could report not just on recidivism but on a great deal more. The official record that tells you John Doe was re-arrested within five years of release will also tell you for what he was arrested and how long after his release the arrest occurred. Moreover, if John Doe is arrested three times more, those arrest records, when viewed together and compared against John's criminal history, will tell you whether he is slowing down or speeding up in terms of his criminal productivity and whether his behavior is escalating, diminishing, or holding steady in terms of severity. That kind of information, averaged out across the larger population of graduates and controls, can also tell you whether a study group is, in the main, offending more or less the same or differently than they historically have done in addition to how their offending 171 patterns compare to those of the control group. This information would allow a picture to emerge of change over time-a picture that is less focused on whether former offenders have fully terminated their criminal careers (though it could reveal that as well) and more interested in whether they are desisting from or persisting in criminal behavior as a result of their engagement with a specific intervention. Although this data would be subject to all of the limitations of data on recidivism generally (inconsistent definitions, over and under-inclusion of criminal behavior through reliance on official court records, etc.)174, it would be far superior to current reliance on recidivism rates alone.
It would be inaccurate to say that the methods described above, so commonplace in academic criminological research, are never reflected in evaluations by professionals within the criminal justice system. Periodically, system analysts will issue a study or white paper demonstrating the ability to use recidivism data to produce more nuanced information (reporting on the age of recidivists or classifying the nature of their re-arrest, for example)175, but these are the exception and not the rule. Far too often, recidivism continues to be reported-and therefore understood-as a binary event rather than as the dynamic process it is. As the following section explains, that is a missed opportunity.
IV. THE LIMITS OF RECIDIVISM DATA
In light of the mechanisms of change discussed above, it is clear that using markers of desistance to measure and report on the effectiveness of criminal justice programs would have significant benefits. It may be less clear, however, how the failure to utilize these more nuanced markers is actively harmful to the criminal justice system and those affected by it. The following section discusses three problems that can be created when the binary metric of recidivism is used to measure the success of the criminal justice system. These include data gaming, risk-aversive behavior by system actors, and the premature termination of otherwise-promising programs for advancing public safety. 174 See supra Section II; infra Section IV. 175 See, e.g., U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, THE EFFECTS OF AGING ON A. DATA GAMING Criminal justice programs are under tremendous pressure to produce data that demonstrates significant "good" outcomes, and that pressure canin ways both conscious and subconscious-affect the validity of the data they generate.176 Scandals in education related to the falsification of standardized test results are an analogous example;177 making criminal justice system actors accountable for reducing recidivism incentivizes gaming the underlying data. Placing a high premium on recidivism rates encourages program administrators not to reduce re-offending so much as to reduce statistical rates of recidivism.178 As a result, improvements in recidivism rates often tell us more about the behavior of system actors than of individuals with prior criminal records. Two examples help illustrate this point.
First, consider recent efforts across the country to reduce failure rates for individuals on community supervision. In states from California to North Carolina, large numbers of people have, at times, been re-incarcerated while serving sentences of probation or parole.179 Sometimes, the triggering event for re-incarceration is the commission of a new crime.180 Other times, incarceration is triggered by the violation of non-criminal rule, ranging from minor infractions to more serious violations.181 As discussed earlier, many times these returns to custody are coded as instances of recidivism. 182 Recognizing the political, fiscal, and human costs associated with such community supervision "failure," many states have undertaken efforts to reduce their revocation rates. 183 There is anecdotal evidence that arrest decisions are shifting from a lesser reliance on arrests for supervision violations to a greater reliance on arrests for felonies . . . . These shifting patterns will directly impact reported rates of recidivism, and it will be challenging to separate changes in discretionary decision-making from changes in underlying offender behavior .190 A similar phenomenon can be seen in Arizona. In 2008, 6,800 people were revoked from supervision in the state.191 That same year, the state legislature passed the Safe Communities Act, which, among other things, shortened periods of supervision for people who were in compliance with the terms of supervision (thereby reducing the time they were "at hazard" of revocation) and "[c]reated incentives for county probation agencies to reduce revocations."192 The effort was met with modest success: while the supervision population held steady, the number of annual revocations had decreased to 4,800 by 2016. 193 In a short period of time, both California and Arizona saw notable reductions in recidivism-defined-as-revocation rates for those on community supervision. 194 In both cases, however, there is no reason to think that these improvements in recidivism-as-revocation rates were driven by changes in the behavior of people on supervision.195 Instead, the reductions appear to reflect a conscious decision by the agencies overseeing probationers and parolees to take a less punitive approach to violations of supervision rules, either by choice (Arizona) or legal necessity (California).196 While such outcomes may reflect wise public policy decisions, they do not suggest that those on supervision desisted. Instead, they suggest that system actors changed their response. These examples illustrate the ways in which recidivism data can be altered in ways that reflect external, political factors as much individual, behavioral ones.
Probation supervision is not the only place where overreliance on recidivism rates can alter the behavior of system actors in unintended ways. Specialty courts, such as drug courts, provide another example of how the behavior of system actors-rather than offenders-sometimes changes in order to improve reported recidivism rates for program participants. Drug courts are popular specialty programs that developed out of concern about the over-criminalization of addiction.197 Drug courts offer a more collaborative model of decision-making, with a judge and lawyers as members of a larger "treatment team."198 Participants are given access to drug treatment and other needed resources in lieu of traditional adversarial adjudication. 199 Graduates typically see their original charges dismissed or reduced, while those terminated for non-compliance are sentenced traditionally. 200 Program success (and in turn, continued funding) is ordinarily determined by the recidivism rates of program graduates as compared to traditionally-prosecuted defendants.201
Placing such significance on graduates' recidivism rates creates two well-documented problems in data generation. First, drug courts are incentivized to limit entry to individuals with the highest prospect of successfully completing the program and going on to avoid re-offense. In many cases, this means that drug courts limit participation to first-time, nonviolent offenders with no co-occurring conditions202-the very people who are least likely to need any intervention at all. For many of these individuals, the program is likely to make no difference; they were already unlikely to commit new crimes.
In addition to limiting entry to low-risk candidates, over emphasis on recidivism rates also pressures drug courts to quickly terminate from the program any participants who are having difficulty remaining sober-a difficulty those with serious substance abuse problems would be expected to have. Because these addicts are predictably less likely than their lessaddicted counterparts to avoid future reconviction, drug court administrators have an incentive to exclude them from the cohort of graduates whose performance will drive future funding of the program.203 This disincentive to continue working with more serious drug offenders undercuts the very purpose for which drug courts exist (i.e., to assist people in overcoming addiction and related criminal behavior). It also leads to harsher punishment for serious addicts. Research has consistently found that individuals sentenced after being terminated from drug court programs face punishment many times harsher than traditionally-sentenced drug offenders. 204 [Vol. 109 Overreliance on recidivism rates as a success metric encourages drug court programs to reject the very people who are most likely to benefit from the extra resources the drug court offers. The irony is acute because substance abuse treatment providers have long embraced the mantra that "relapse is a part of recovery" and that the road to sobriety almost always includes set-backs205-many of which would qualify as "recidivism" if detected and punished.
The pressure to create good outcome statistics by limiting access to programs is not limited to the drug court context. All criminal justice programs that are assessed based on their reported reductions in recidivism rates find themselves in a similar bind: admit those who most need help and who are therefore at highest risk of recidivating, or admit those with lower risks and needs who will be less likely to recidivate. When funding turns on recidivism reductions, the pressure to game the data is particularly acute. 206 If you admit those in most need of help, you increase your reported failure rates; if you admit those who do not need your help, your programs success rates skyrocket. Discussing this problem in the context of juvenile justice, one foundation director explained; "One way to have low recidivism rates is to sweep up kids who are low risk and formally handle them in the system . . . .If the system concentrates only on very high-risk kids you'll probably have higher recidivism rates." 207 How would these outcomes be different if desistance were the measure of success rather than recidivism? While there are opportunities for data gaming in any system, the incentives to game decrease as emphasis shifts away from demonstrating perfect outcomes and toward demonstrating realistic, measurable progress. If programs were deemed successful when their participants improved and not just when they achieved perfection, program administrators might become willing to treat more serious offenders than they currently do. These more serious or prolific criminals might go on to recidivate in some way but if the treatment they receive were to yield a measurable decrease in later offense severity and frequency, public safety would improve much more than if a minor offender is treated with a perfect result. By removing the incentive for program administrators to focus their efforts on those least likely to recidivate, policymakers could encourage the development and expansion of programs that promote measurable desistance among those with whom they intervene.
B. PREMATURE TERMINATION OF PROMISING PROGRAMS
A second problem created by overreliance on recidivism rates is the risk that promising interventions may be prematurely declared failures. If the only meaningful measure of a program's success is the rate at which it reduces recidivism, programs that demonstrably promote desistance, but do not in themselves change recidivism rates, are at risk of termination.
As an initial matter, it is important to recognize that a sizeable percentage of people who undergo any criminal justice intervention will not recidivate. This is not because the criminal justice system exerts a pervasive ameliorative influence, but rather because without intervention, most people who come into contact with the criminal justice system once will not do so again.208 As with any antisocial or maladaptive human behavior, crime can be habitual, periodic, or anomalous. If the behavior is truly anomalous, then desistance is not necessary: the offender moves directly from crime to termination. The behavior will not repeat, and no intervention is needed. 209 For those whose behavior is not anomalous, however, the process of desistance "resides somewhere in the interfaces between developing personal maturity, changing social bonds associated with certain life transitions, and the individual subjective narrative constructions which offenders build around these key events and changes."210 In light of the complex interplay between all of these factors, it is implausible to suggest that any one program or intervention-however well-conceived or delivered-can reliably transform persistent offenders into law-abiding citizens who will never again run afoul of the law.
In reality, when a program claims to work dramatic changes in the recidivism rates of its program graduates, it is likely that those individuals did not need the program at all.211 A far more likely inference is that they were already far along the path of desistance because their criminal behavior was either anomalous or situational.
But while dramatic claims of recidivism reduction should always be a cause for skepticism, the opposite is not always true. If a program does not demonstrate its ability to significantly reduce recidivism rates, it is not necessarily a poor investment. First, many programs have independent humanitarian value. By providing convicted individuals with education, emotional support, skill development, or treatment for addiction and other challenges, the state recognizes the inherent dignity of those over whom it exercises control.212 Second, at least some of these programs likely play an important foundational role in fostering desistance.
Consider the transtheoretical model of change. Contemplation and preparation are necessary prerequisites to action in that model, but those early stages do not in themselves yield evidence of behavior change.213 Criminal justice programs that provide opportunities for individuals to imagine change where they previously could not or that assist individuals in devising plans for how to make needed changes will not always result in reduced rates of recidivism. But by laying a foundation for later change, such programs may provide the necessary groundwork on which later progress will rest. To identify such programs, it will be necessary to look for metrics more nuanced than pure recidivism: metrics that better reflect the realities of behavioral change and the influence that criminal justice interventions can have on promoting that change over time.
Markers of desistance are a good start. By examining the pattern of offending behavior that an individual displays over time, it is possible to discern whether a person's criminal behavior is escalating or diminishing and whether it is gaining momentum or losing speed. Each alteration provides 210 an opportunity for intervention, whether by connecting a freshly-desisting young person with employment (a known pathway to long-term desistance214) or by offering a cognitive-behavioral intervention to a person whose behavior evinces a pattern of increasing entanglement with crime.
C. RISK AVERSION
Finally, overreliance on recidivism rates encourages risk aversive behavior by system actors, thus exacerbating mass incarceration and limiting opportunities for convicted individuals to master the skills that will ultimately lead to long-term desistance.
The modern criminal justice system is risk averse by any measure. Over the past half century, despite falling crime rates, criminal charges have increased.215 Sentences have lengthened.216 Parole and other forms of backend release have been significantly restricted. 217 Revocations from community supervision have risen. 218 Criminal justice bureaucrats are haunted by the fear that, on their watch, a released defendant, probationer, or parolee will commit a crime and wind up as front page news. 219 The result is a paralyzed system.
The emphasis that has been placed on recidivism rates and their reduction psychologically reinforces the idea that the job of the criminal justice system is to prevent crime at all costs, even if that means confining behind bars people whose conduct does not pose a serious risk of harm to others and those who have demonstrated that they are engaged in the process of behavioral change. To the worried parole board member or probation officer, a system that rises and falls on recidivism rates alone is one in which any infraction, however small, counts as failure. In such a world, it will always be easier to lock up the technical violator or never parole the model [Vol. 109 inmate because such behaviors will always protect the political interests of agencies and administrators.
If, instead, success were gauged by more holistic metrics-including markers of desistance-incentives would shift. A chronic offender's minor violation, coming after a long period of good behavior, would be a cause for attention but not necessarily alarm. Relapse by a chronic drug offender would not be reason to declare treatment a failure if it reduced use and associated new crime. Opportunities to celebrate success would increase for both individuals in the system and the criminal justice system itself. Judges and prosecutors, too, might begin to ask more critical questions about defendants' predicted risk of recidivism. Instead of reflexively balking at a medium or high predicted risk of re-offense, system actors might ask important interpretive questions such as, "What is this offender at risk of doing?," and "Does the evidence suggest that this person is on a path of persistence or desistance?" The answers to those questions would guide the use of predictive risk tools, placing recidivism risks into a larger, more holistic context that is likely to yield sentences that would better advance fairness and public safety.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD MARKERS OF DESISTANCE
In an article on recidivism, Robert Weisberg mused:
Perhaps we should not be asking whether a criminal recidivates or not, or whether recidivist acts occur or not. Perhaps we should not even be focusing on the frequency of recidivism for a person or a society . . . . [P]erhaps a better measure-or rough guide to a better measure-is to ask whether as a result of a state intervention the offender reoffends less frequently or less harmfully than he otherwise might, especially by comparison to the likely downward arc of criminality due to aging.220 Indeed, given all that is known about how behavior change occurs and what the criminal justice system can do to help or hinder that change process, the present focus on recidivism rates misses the mark. It is only by looking at the pattern of behavior revealed by recidivism data that those within and outside the criminal justice system can begin to see the ways in which criminal justice interventions may be promoting desistance and ways the in which they may be hindering it.
Changing metrics of success from rates of recidivism to markers of desistance will leave many problems unresolved. Like the simple recidivism data on which they draw, markers of desistance can reveal only what behavior has come to law enforcement attention, not what behavior is 220 occurring on the streets and within homes. The underlying data will still be skewed by inconsistencies in policing, charging, and correctional supervision practices, as is the case with recidivism data more generally.221 Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, markers of desistance will still fail to capture many of the more holistic ways in which the pro-social progress of those entangled in the criminal justice system might be measured. Markers of desistance will not tell whether people are creating meaningful and healthy relationships; or whether they are gainfully employed and able to meet their basic human needs; whether they feel connected to their communities.222 These markers of well-being are not easily quantifiable, but they are no less important measures of the ways in which criminal justice interventions may be improving-or worsening-the condition of those with whom they intervene.
Nevertheless, in a world committed to measurement, there are better measurements than recidivism. By attending to markers of desistance, policymakers and criminal justice system actors and administrators can begin to develop a significantly more nuanced picture of individual change over time and of the role that criminal justice interventions play in promoting or hindering that change pro817cess. 221 See discussion supra Section I.A. 222 Cf. Michael M. O'Hear, The Second Chance Act and the Future of Reentry Reform, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 75, 76 (2007) (expressing concern that "the tendency to frame and evaluate reentry initiatives as solely, or even primarily, recidivism reduction measures" ignores "many important social welfare and social justice concerns implicated in the treatment of returning prisoners").
